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Abstract. Mobile health (mHealth) apps are an ideal tool for monitor-
ing and tracking long-term health conditions. In this paper, we examine
whether mHealth apps succeed in ensuring the privacy, security, and
safety of the health data entrusted to them. We investigate 154 apps
from Android app stores using both automatic code and metadata anal-
ysis and a manual analysis of functionality and data leakage. Our study
focuses on hypertension and diabetes, two common health conditions
that require careful tracking of personal health data.
We find that many apps do not provide privacy policies or safe com-
munications, are implemented in an insecure fashion, fail basic input
validation tests and often have overall low code quality which suggests
additional security and safety risks. We conclude with recommendations
for App Stores, App developers, and end users.
1 Introduction
Mobile health (mHealth) applications cover all areas of health IT, from health
information databases to personal electronic medical records. They are very
popular—according to appbrain.com, in December 2014, Google Play had 21,457
apps in the medical category and 3% of these have been downloaded more than
50,000 times. mHealth apps for Android and iOS are currently largely unreg-
ulated [17]. Many of these apps are written by individuals or small companies
who see a market niche, or by pharma and drugstore companies that seek to
provide added value and collect information about their customer base [23].
Around 20% of medical apps cost money, on average US $9.78, making them
the most expensive category. This suggests that users attach a high value to
mHealth apps. But does this buy data protection?
Many mHealth apps handle highly sensitive data that require particular pri-
vacy and security precautions [13]. For example, insurers demand full disclosure
of pre-existing conditions. If insurers find mHealth data that suggest an unre-
ported condition, the applicant may be denied coverage or their policy may be
downgraded.
In this paper, we examine how far a representative sample of 154 mHealth
Android apps for two common long-term conditions, diabetes and hypertension,
succeed in ensuring the privacy, security, and safety of the health data entrusted
2 Konstantin Knorr, David Aspinall, and Maria Wolters
to them. While previous work has considered relatively diverse samples of 40–50
mHealth apps at once [3, 6, 9, 10], we focus on a the management of long-term
conditions which require users to regularly track key health indicators. Such
conditions are an ideal mHealth use case. Well-designed apps allow users to
enter data when and where they choose, to communicate with carers and health
care professionals, and to discover trends and patterns in their own medical data.
Contributions. We introduce a novel method that takes into account the files
contained in the APK (i.e., the downloaded package of the app), the dynamic
behaviour of the installed app, and the app’s privacy policy. We also consider
input validation and source code quality. This comprehensive evaluation goes
beyond previous studies, which mainly examined permissions and network traffic.
In addition, our clear focus on long-term conditions allows an in-depth discussion
of the specific privacy concerns.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 introduces mHealth
apps and the categories we examine in detail; we explain the high-level func-
tionality they provide, and discuss potential privacy threats. Sect. 3 describes
the proposed methodology, while Sect. 4 gives the corresponding results and its
discussion following the structure of the methodology. Suggestions for improving
the current privacy issues of mHealth apps and future work conclude the paper
in Sect. 5.
2 Hypertension and Diabetes
We focus on two long-term health conditions, hypertension and diabetes. Peo-
ple with hypertension suffer from chronically elevated blood pressure, which in-
creases the risk of many serious illnesses including cardiovascular disease, stroke,
and chronic kidney disease. Diabetes is a group of diseases that are characterised
by elevated blood sugar levels. Controlling blood sugar is therefore the main aim
of treatment.
Both conditions can be tracked using a simple numerical indicator, blood
pressure (hypertension) and blood glucose level (diabetes), both are highly preva-
lent in the population3, and for both conditions, self-monitoring is an important
part of clinical management [14, 19].
The key function of a monitoring app is to capture a reading of the indicator
measure at a given point in time. Fig. 1 shows a sample user interface for manual
input of hypertension with a basic set of fields. Fields may not have a clearly
defined use, such as “My Item” in our example, and others can contain free text,
such as “Note”.
Typical additional functionality includes providing reminders; data analy-
sis and reporting; and backup, sharing, and export of recorded data. Some
apps support several user profiles, while others include functionality for emer-
gency texts and telephone calls. The main menu screen of Diabetes Journal
3 Hypertension affects 25%–55% of the population depending on the country and the
definition, while diabetes affects 8.5% of Europeans.
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(com.suderman.diabeteslog, Fig. 2) shows how this functionality is typically
implemented. “Averages” and “Charts” cover the data analysis and reporting
function, the “Calendar” supports reminders, “Entries” leads to an entry screen
for blood glucose values, and “Profiles” allows users to switch profiles.
Fig. 1. Input in iBP Blood Pressure Fig. 2. Functions of Diabetes Journal
For both blood pressure and blood glucose levels, there are well documented
clinical guidelines that govern their interpretation, such as those issued by the
UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). But integrating values
collected using mHealth apps into clinical management is difficult. As long as
most apps rely on manual data entry [7], data quality is questionable, especially
given that, as we will see in Sect. 4, apps may fail to perform basic validity
checks on the health data they receive from the user.
2.1 Privacy threats and relevant regulation
In the US, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
sets legal security and privacy standards for electronically transmitted health
information; in the EU, there are diverse country-specific laws that need to be
respected [5]. Devices that collect measurements which are used for monitoring,
treatment, or diagnosis of health conditions are medical devices and these are
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration in the US. The key medical
device directive in the EU is Directive 93/42/EEC, which was updated in 2007.
Smartphone apps for monitoring diabetes and hypertension, in particular
those that do not directly receive data from a validated blood pressure or blood
glucose meter, fall into a grey area that is not adequately covered by current
standards [11, 17], and finding a good balance between encouraging innovation
and ensuring privacy is challenging [22].
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Several frameworks have been proposed for classifying the threat that mHealth
applications pose to the privacy of health information (e.g. [13]). Most of these
focus on information that would make the patient identifiable, in particular ID
or social security numbers. While many self-management apps do not collect
those data, they do often store name, gender, and date of birth. Privacy threats
also depend on the type of mHealth app [11], and on the condition that is being
managed.
Internet
App Shop
for inital Download,
Billing and Licensing
Ad and Analytics 
Infrastructure App Web Server Social Mediae.g. Facebook, Twitter
External Storage like
Dropbox, Google Drive
External Medical Equipment 
e.g. Blood Pressure Monitor
SD Card e.g. 
DB Backup, 
Reports
Internal Storage
Short Range 
Communciation
e.g. NFC, Bluetooth
Mobile Communications Network 
e.g. SMS, emergency calls
Reports
SMTP, HTTP, HTTPS
HTTP, HTTPS
Smart Phone
Fig. 3. An mHealth app in context. The heart indicates medical data.
2.2 Threat scenarios for mHealth apps in use
Fig. 3 shows a smart phone with mHealth apps installed. Medical data like blood
pressure or glucose values can be input by the user or, less commonly, received
from external medical devices via Bluetooth or NFC. The smartphone stores the
app’s data internally either in a database or the internal file structure. The SD
card is used for database backups and restores, and to export reports or selected
medical data. Mobile networks are used for emergency SMS and calls.
Five types of servers are potentially connected to the smartphone and app.
The App Shop is used to initially download and possibly pay for the app. Subse-
quently, connections for licensing and billing e.g. for in-app purchases or upgrades
of the app are maintained. Many of the apps display ads, which are provided
by Ad Servers, most prominently Admob by Google. App developers also use
Analytics such as Google Analytics to track user behaviour. Many apps allow
to upload, backup or synchronize the data to Social Media, Storage Services
or a dedicated external App Web Server provided by the app developer or co-
operating third parties. This server may provide interfaces to other parties like
insurance companies, doctors, or hospitals. Most apps allow sending e-mails with
medical data. This is typically done via an Android e-mail “intent” which con-
nects to a (implicitly trusted) email app on the phone. Overall, the complexity
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in this picture emphasises the privacy challenges faced by a user trying to keep
control over his/her medical data.
3 Methodology
We selected mHealth apps for diabetes and blood pressure which: (1) had an
English or German user interface; (2) would run on a Google Nexus 7 test de-
vice with Android 4.4.2 installed; (3) had over 10,000 downloads (for free apps)
or over 1,000 (for paid). Most apps came from the medical category and were
specifically developed for diabetes and blood pressure monitoring. We ended
up with 154 apps in the final test set (55% diabetes, 35% blood pressure, 10%
both) that were installed on the Nexus 7. The most popular apps are My Heart
(com.szyk.myheart) and BP Watch (com.boxeelab.healthlete.bpwatch) which
each have between one and five million downloads.4
3.1 Our method
The investigation has four parts: (A) static analysis; (B) dynamic analysis;
(C) web server security and (D) privacy policy inspection. Fig. 4 shows a pic-
ture of the method. The results were gathered in a database. Static analysis was
applied to the full set of 154 apps; other analysis stages were applied to subsets.
Database
File
System
Nexus 7
App Stores
Select, buy,
download Apps
Extract APKs
Retrieve Meta Data
like Price, URL of Privacy Policy,
Number of Downloads
Vendors WebSite
(B) Dynamic Analysis
(A) Static Analysis
Retrieve
Privacy
Policies
(D) Analysis of
Privacy Policy
APKs
Privacy Policies
Generate
Statistics
Statistics
and Findings
Save results of
Testing in Database
and File System
Web Server
(C) Web Server
Security
App Store
Fig. 4. Analysis method
4 The full details of the apps analysed, along with a database of our results and details
about the tools used can be found at the URL http://tinyurl.com/mhealthapps.
A more comprehensive description of the method can be found in [12].
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(A) Static analysis. The static analysis is based on the information contained
in the APK file, including the manifest and the compiled code (in the file
classes.dex). Results for the top 10 apps are shown in Table 1. We used Mal-
loDroid [8] to identify faulty SSL usage, such as the failure to check certificate
chains; this would allow man-in-the-middle attacks which enable an attacker to
access all medical data transmitted. OpenSSL was used to extract certificate
information and find certificates with poorly chosen cryptologic parameters [4].
We checked Android content providers and debugging flags using Drozer.
The ContentProvider class allows sharing data between applications, with its
own access control model. A careful implementation will prevent unauthorized
access to sensitive data. When the debug flag for Android is set, the application
can be debugged, even when running on a device in user mode, thereby possibly
revealing medical information.
Addons Detector was used to identify and classify the add-on libraries used
by the apps. Health apps were scanned for malicious code, security vulnerabili-
ties and privacy failings using Snoopwall Privacy App, Clueful, AVG Antivirus
Security, AVAST, McAfee, and the Recap vulnerability scanner.
We assessed code quality by using FindBugs to count the number of likely-
bug patterns occurring in apps; high numbers indicate a likely poor code qual-
ity, which suggests possible unreliable behaviour, giving additional security and
safety risks.
(B) Dynamic analysis. We analysed the 72 most frequently downloaded apps,
including all those with web interfaces to external servers. We set up Facebook,
Twitter, Dropbox, and Gmail accounts for a patient for whom some values were
out of the physiologically normal range. The patient was 170 cm tall, weighed 99
kg, had dangerously high blood pressure (200 mmHg/120 mmHg), a physiologi-
cally improbable heart rate (333 bpm) and a blood glucose level of 111 mmol/L,
which is lethal and indicates that the user confused mg/dL with mmol/L.
We generated Facebook, Twitter and Dropbox accounts for the patient and
tested all available export routes for the data. We investigated whether abnormal
and illegal inputs were accepted, and how exported data was stored or trans-
mitted. Using the Android debugger command adb pull and the adb logcat
command, we tested whether the backups or log data contained unencrypted
medical data. We also established whether the app included a feature to erase
all stored medical data, whether there was a privacy policy for the app, and
whether the permissions required by the app were reasonable.
(C) Web server connection. For apps that can interface with a dedicated web
server (n=20) using a user account for uploading data, we checked whether a
sensible password policy was enforced on the web site and tested the Web Server
connection. We recorded the URLs used for connections and noted if they used
a secure transport (https:). We recorded traffic to see if passwords or medical
data in textual or graphical form could be sniffed in clear text.
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(D) Inspection of privacy policies. Only 19% of apps in (A) have a privacy poli-
cies. This is far lower than the proportion found by Sunyaev et al. [18] in their
survey of the 600 most commonly used apps, where 30% of all apps had some
form of privacy policy. Since storage of medical data on an external server fur-
ther stresses privacy concerns, we limited the test to the same apps as in (C).
We assessed privacy policies on basic information provided (URL to privacy pol-
icy, length in words, version, and country of origin), completeness (information
about the OECD criteria accountability, security safeguards, openness, purpose,
individual participation [2]), and invasiveness (possible use for other purposes,
storage by third party, potential to be passed on to third parties) by asking basic
questions and trying to find answers in the documents.
4 Results and discussion
Table 1. Analysis results for the top 20 downloaded apps. Columns: lack of a privacy
policy, existence of MalloDroid errors, debug flag enabled, missing access protection of
content provider, poor certificate parameters, usage of ad and analytics addons, more
than 300 FindBugs errors, usage of more than 5 Android permissions, lack of input
validation for input data, absence of a wipe feature.
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com.szyk.myheart.... 1000000 BP × × × × 4
com.ptashek.bplog... 500000 BP × × × × 4
com.gexperts.ontrack 500000 DIAB × × × × × 5
com.fourtechnologies 100000 BP × × × × × × 6
com.orangekit.bpress 100000 BP × × × × 4
com.szyk.diabetes... 100000 DIAB × × × × 4
net.klier.blutdruck. 100000 BP × × × × × × 6
com.skyhealth.glucos 100000 DIAB × × × × 4
org.fruct.yar.bloodp 100000 BP × × × × × × × 7
com.freshware.bloodp 100000 BP × × × × × × 6
com.jucdejeb.bloodpr 100000 BP × × × × × × × 7
com.suderman.diabete 50000 DIAB × × × × × × × × 8
com.zlamanit.blood.p 50000 BP × × × × × 5
com.freshware.dbees. 50000 DIAB × × × × × 5
com.squaremed...typ1 50000 DIAB × × × × 4
com.squaremed...andr 50000 DIAB × × × × × × × 7
com.mydiabetes...... 50000 DIAB × × × × × × 6
kr.co.openit.bpdiary 50000 BP × × × × × 5
com.sidiary.app..... 50000 DIAB × × × × × × 6
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Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of our results. In both Tables, × is used to
indicate a problem, and the score is the number of problems found.
We found that paid apps tend to use fewer ads (even though some keep the
ad libraries code) and offer more functionality (like e-mail or SD card export).
Concerning the other tests, we could not find major differences. Especially com-
paring “twin apps” (free and paid version of same app) produced similar results.
Static analysis. The number of permissions used ranges from 0 (28 apps) to
17 with an average of 4.35. The most frequently requested Android permis-
sions are INTERNET (126 times), followed by WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE (117),
and ACCESS NETWORK STATE (109). The permission BLUETOOTH is used 18 times,
NFC 3 times. Of the 126 apps using the INTERNET permission, 15 do not cor-
rectly verify certificates or certificate paths, allowing for MITM attacks. Six apps
had the debuggable flag set to “true” in their manifest, possibly allowing debug
connections to inspect medical data. 17 apps use content providers that were
accessible to other apps on the device, and four revealed medical data to all
other apps on the device.
Apps are infested by ad and analytic addons on a large scale. The addons
in the Advertising (74 apps, Admob being dominant) and Analytics (27 apps,
Google Analytics dominant) category have been identified as a major privacy
problems transferring device IDs and other data. Eight apps use Facebook or
Twitter addons.
All apps used self-signed certificates, although using an acknowledged CA
could establish additional trust. Certificates of 4 apps have a life time of ∼1,000
years, another 6 of ∼100 years. Most of them are valid for ∼30 years. The
majority use SHA1, and only 17% the more secure SHA256. Only 40 certificates
give more information than the name of the developer, thereby not establishing
additional trust by adding more detailed information.
The Clueful tool gave a privacy score of 56 out of 100 for the apps on the
test device and identified no high risk app and 57 moderate risk apps. The
ranking is purely based on permissions. Snoopwall also just lists permissions
for each app. Recap is a vulnerability scanner based on 1,800 CVE numbers.
All its findings were OS related. We additionally checked if the apps in our
test set in its current or earlier version are listed in the National Vulnerability
Database http://www.nvd.org (NVD) and found no entries. AVG classified
com.stevenmz.BloodPressureDiary as malware and MMSL.BGGlucoDiary as
“Potentially Unwanted Program” without giving a detailed explanation5. Avast
and McAfee did not find any malware, privacy or security issue.
Dynamic analysis. 43 of 50 blood pressure apps allow users to enter alarmingly
high blood pressure values of 200 / 120 mmHg with the current time, some
marking this (e.g. colouring the values read), some not. 20 of 50 blood glucose
monitoring apps allow the meaningless reading of 111 mmol/L, and 24 of 46
5 We did not find any suspicious network traffic caused by these two apps during the
dynamic analysis
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Fig. 5. BloodPressure Record Lite allows
to enter lethal blood pressure values
Fig. 6. Diabetes Journal (Suderman) al-
lows to enter lethal blood sugar values
apps that monitor pulse allow a value of 333 bpm (s. Figs. 5 and 6). Some of
the apps even allowed to input letters instead of numerical values. This raises
serious safety concerns. Lacking input validation stands for poor code quality
and is a precondition for attacks like SQL injection, XSS, and XSRF.
The majority of apps do not protect the medical data when stored in the
internal storage. An attacker gaining physical access to the device can thereby
access or manipulate these data. This attack can be impeded but not entirely
prevented by using the phone’s security mechanisms like PIN protection and
device encryption. In contrast to [9, 10] we did not find any sensitive data in
Android’s main and event log. Only 4 apps allowed to protect the app with an
extra password.
49 of 72 apps export medical data to SD card. All but one of these do not
protect the data when doing so. The one exception is MyLists, which is not
a specific health app. Thus, an attacker with physical access to the device can
steal the SD card and gain thereby access to the medical data. This finding is
surprising as some of the developer tools included in the apps like PDFTron would
allow encryption. This also indicates dead code in the APKs. Only 32% of the
apps provide a “wipe” feature to delete all medical data entered. Unfortunately,
the SD card is often omitted from this wipe.
68% of the apps allowed to send e-mails. None of these allowed for sending
encrypted messages or attachments. This could allow attackers with access to the
network infrastructure (e.g. in WLANs) to sniff or even manipulate e-mails in
transit. Besides export to 20 different web servers, we successfully exported data
to Facebook (2 apps), Twitter (2), Google Drive (6), and Dropbox (8) without
receiving a privacy warning by the app.
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Several ad networks transmit the app’s package name plus other device and
app specific data in clear text which allows a passive eavesdropper to gather
the information which device is using which app. This can often traced back
to individual users thereby laying open that a user has diabetes or is track-
ing their blood pressure. We found this among others in HTTP traffic related
to doubleclick.net, googleapis.com, gstatic.com, applovin.com. Similar
findings (albeit not for mHealth) have been reported in [21].
Web applications. 35% of all analysed apps transmit medical data in textual
or other forms (like pictures, charts, files) in clear text using HTTP. This is
not limited to blood pressure or glucose values but also includes weight, BMI,
and pulse (Fig. 7). The same percentage of passwords can be sniffed in clear-
text. The password policies also leave much to be desired. One app allows empty
passwords, 5 are fine with one character passwords, and only 3 ask for or generate
passwords of 8 characters or more. Additionally, 17 of 20 apps accept password
consisting just of numbers in a chronological order which allows easy brute force
and dictionary attacks.
Table 2. Results of the privacy policy and web security analysis
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com.fourtechnologies.myne 100000 × × × × × × × × × × ×
com.freshware.dbees...... 50000 × × × × × - - ×
com.glooko.logbook....... 5000 × × × × × × - × ×
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com.leadingedgeapps.ibp.. 5000 × × × × × × × × × - - -
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Fig. 7. Clear text blood pressure reading (com.oxygenhealthcom.lsmeasure)
Privacy policy. Only 19% of all 154 refer to a privacy policy in the app stores, but
this number increases to 67% for apps which allow users to sync data with web
servers. On average, the policies are 632 words long. Only 6 policies stem from
2014, the others being older, 4 give no date. mHealth is a global business with a
trend towards USA and Germany. While the majority of the policies cover the
OECD privacy principles of accountability, security safeguards, openness, and
purpose at least partly, over half of the policies do not address the rights of the
individual like the right of data deletion. None of the policies denies using the
data internally e.g., for marketing or research. 9 policies explicitly say that they
do so. All policies addressing mergers note that medical data may be transferred
or even sold. 50% of the apps (that address this issue) say that medical data can
be passed on to other 3rd parties (other than required by law).
5 Conclusions
Through our in-depth analysis, we found clear evidence of privacy, safety, and
security concerns for the majority of the apps we analysed. Current health pol-
icy strongly encourages people to manage chronic conditions themselves, and
mHealth is seen as a key tool for effective self management. But the apps people
use should not leave them vulnerable to cyberattacks. While the consequences of
such attacks may be relatively mild for the conditions we studied, hypertension
and diabetes, they may be more severe for stigmatised conditions such as HIV+
or mental illness.
Some of the issues, such as the pervasive lack of encryption, indicate security
is not a priority for developers. Reports, charts, and tables of medical data are
often stored without any protection, giving thieves and eavesdroppers easy ac-
cess. Another important threat is advertising. Of the 154 apps tested, 74 include
advertisement addons. These addons often transmit the app’s package name in
clear text in the HTTP header which discloses the usage of this app (which is,
per se, sensitive) to eavesdroppers. We also pointed out that current malware
and privacy scanners fail to identify privacy issues in mHealth apps.
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On the user interface side, we found that input data was often not validated
or badly validated. This is a major concern when users want to share their
self-curated data with health care professionals. The problems that arise from
badly validated and designed data input forms have been studied extensively,
and design guidelines have been formulated, but many app developers (and many
medical device manufacturers) still fail to adhere to them [20].
App developers also rarely provide privacy policies. Although most users are
unlikely to read such policies [15], we would still expect that privacy policies
offer a reasonably complete summary of all major privacy issues for people who
do read them. Most of the policies we analysed fell far short of this goal. Quote6:
“Sinovo endeavours to use on the data minimally. The customer expressly agrees
to the use of data in this context.”
Recommendations. Due to the manifold concerns over the privacy and security
of health data that users enter into mHealth apps in good faith, we suggest that
app shops should mandate and enforce the existence of a privacy policy for apps
that would like to be listed in the Health section. They could provide a template
which systematically addresses the major principles and encourage automated
security checking of apps with tools like MalloDroid or Drozer.
Such a step would automatically encourage developers to invest time and
effort in ensuring users’ privacy. Secure coding guidelines like [1] are a good
start. Developers should leverage existing tools to encrypt all data stored both
on the device and on external servers. Finally, developers should also ensure that
the privacy policy is up to date, follows the OECD principles, and informs end
users about use of their data and data protection.
Ad Networks, an important revenue source for free medical apps, are also
a major source of privacy leaks. Here, many concerns could be addressed by
mandating the usage of SSL to protect the HTTP traffic.
Looking at the Android operating system, the INTERNET permission seems
too coarse. Currently it is not possible to differentiate whether a mHealth app
wants to communicate with a health care provider or if an ad server is contacted.
A possible solution could be the inclusion of firewall features in future Android
versions, but this might conflict with Google’s ad driven business model.
The recommendation to end users is to perform due diligence, including
reading the description, privacy policy, and commenting on security issues, trying
to take advantage of scores for privacy measures such as ours and those given by
others [3, 6]. But the information currently available prior to installation is not
enough for users to make these informed decisions. Therefore, a privacy aware
user needs to use additional mechanisms like Android’s phone encryption, ad
block apps, or encryption apps. This is only feasible for technically savvy users.
Related work. Work closest to our contribution stems from [3, 6, 9, 10]. Njie [6]
analyses 43 popular iOS and Android health and fitness apps based on a spread-
sheet with the focus on network analysis and mentions the need to restrict future
6 http://www.sinovo.org/?id=144
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studies to a more specific category of apps. He et al. [10, 9] analyse 47 randomly
selected iOS and Android mHealth apps in a series of two studies regarding In-
ternet usage, logging, content provider, SD cards, and usage of cloud services
and Bluetooth. Adhikari et al. [3] examine the 40 most popular iOS and Android
mHealth apps by answering 9 privacy questions yielding a privacy score.
In contrast these studies, our work focuses (1) on apps for specific purposes,
rather than selecting randomly from the broad category of mHealth apps and
(2) only on Android apps. This gives us a more homogeneous population which
can be closely tested and compared, in particular, it allowed us to check input
validation for specific blood pressure and glucose reading ranges. Our testing
also goes further than previous work: while permissions and network traffic have
been considered, we additionally analyse the APKs and the underlying code and
privacy policies, and source code quality.
Future work. Our methodology is sensitive enough to uncover many privacy and
security concerns, and it can be easily extended to apps for conditions that are
more stigmatised than diabetes and hypertension, such as mental health [16].
We propose to extend our technical work in three ways. First, we want to
extend static analysis to more of the 27 topics in [1], integrating formal usability
assessment, and developing automatic tools that might be used to screen new
candidate apps for mHealth. Given the prevalence of web servers associated with
apps, assessing web application security is an integral part of a full analysis; we’d
like to extend this to consider vulnerability to attacks like SQL injection, XSS,
and XSRF. Finally, apps that use communication links like Bluetooth and NFC
to regulated measurement devices deserve to be examined in detail too, especially
in a “wearable scenario”.
In order to link our results to the eHealth field, we plan to investigate the mo-
tivations of users of mHealth apps and their attitude to the safety, security, and
privacy problems we found. We also plan to investigate reasons why developers
create insecure apps through a questionnaire study.
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